

Requester's Copy

Ref no: 01/REA/22/000076

Name: ICO

Date: 30/09/2Internal Review

Potential

Date of Report: August 2022





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


### Investigation Report

WEB Reference ID	
Name of investigator	
Date of incident	November 2021 - April 2022
Outcome	Formal Disciplinary

All names in this report have been anonymised other than the author — referenced documents, evidence and full names can be found attached to the original Datix.

### **Details of Incident**



The individual formal investigation reports cover all areas of concern; however, this report focuses solely on the breaches of personal information.

## Investigation process

The Trust obtained a download of the group messages between the period of 4<sup>th</sup> November 2021 and 8<sup>th</sup> April 2022. The chat consisted of approximately 60,000 messages, 2,016 images, 484 videos and 150 voice notes.

Due to the varying levels of involvement and content matter, a decision was made to complete individual formal investigation reports for each member of staff involved.

The incident was reported to the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) (reference IC-170897-L7Y4) and NHS Digital (reference 28029) on 16<sup>th</sup> May 2022, scoring a total of 6. On 19<sup>th</sup> May the Trust

informed the ICO that it had increased the level of the score to a 12, following further reviews of the information. The scoring is as follows:

- 4 It is highly likely that there will be an adverse effect
- 3 Information potentially contained within the public domain

That rationale for the increase was due to the risk linked to the loss of control of personal data (potentially within the public domain).

The contents of the chat download have been reviewed by the panel of investigators, with support and oversight from the Information Governance team. Initially, the Trust was only able to access the messages and were not able to view the images, voice notes and videos. Once this technical issue had been overcome, the review discovered 13 data subjects that could potentially be identifiable by the information disclosed. That these disclosures were likely to be classed as personal data protection breaches, as defined by Article 4(12) of the UK GDPR.

"Personal data breach" means a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed.

Under UK Data Protection Legislation, personal data is defined as information that identifies or can be used to identify a natural person. This includes identifiers such as name, address, location details, phone numbers etc. (This list is not exhaustive).

A further review of this information was undertaken by the Information Governance team and a risk assessment conducted against each data subject. Please see Appendix 1.

# Review of incident

The images shared largely consist of photographs and screenshots of the Trust's MDT screen. This is the screen within the ambulance vehicles that displays details of the incidents they are attending as well other information, such as directions etc. Information about an incident will only appear on the screens of the vehicles assigned to attend that incident. In several cases where information was shared, the individuals had redacted some level of personal data from the screenshots/photographs.

One of the images shared (Data Subject 10 within Appendix One) is a photograph of the crew's iPad containing a partially completed electronic Patient Care Record (PCR). The data subject's home environment (photograph taken inside the patient's home) and provided are visible.

Data Subject 9 relates to an image taken within a hospital ward. The photograph has been taken from a distance and includes the patient's face. No further identifiable information can be seen.

During the initial review process the Information Governance team determined that the number of data subjects affected (likely to be identified from the disclosures) reduced from 13 to 11. This was due to the level of information disclosed and accounted for any reductions the individual(s) sharing the images had applied, prior to posting them.

The employees (**Control of March**) involved in this incident were all working within patientfacing roles and would have legitimately had access to the disclosed information as part of those roles.

#### Risk Assessment of data subjects

As detailed within Appendix One, the level of personal data disclosed includes age, gender, reason for the 999 call (health information), location of the emergency (possibly home address) and one data subject's full name. In addition, in some cases, the time of incident and Trust Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) unique reference numbers are also disclosed.

The CAD numbers would be classed as pseudonymised information; only those with access to the Trust's CAD system would be able to identify the data subjects using that reference number.

Having identified 11 data subjects, the Trust's Information Governance team scored the level of the breach using the matrix of likelihood of identification (by external individuals) x potential detriment to give a total risk score. Please see the Key within Appendix One.

Following the initial assessment of the disclosures, further investigations were undertaken, including the use of Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) to assess whether this may impact upon the risk and/or detriment level. These findings have been reflected in the Impact on Scores and Total columns.

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The scoring used was based upon several factors, which included the following:

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- Due to the nature of the information disclosed (personal and special category) the minimum score of detriment was determined as 3 - potentially some adverse effect.
- All the disclosures relate to vulnerable persons (patients in need of medical care) and in some circumstances are of a particularly sensitive nature. Therefore, there may be a higher risk of detriment to those individuals, should they be made aware of the breach of their personal data.
- In some cases, multiple identifiers have been disclosed, which, if coupled with OSINT, could increase the chances of identification.
- 4. In some cases, limited and pseudonymised information has been disclosed. Therefore, it is unlikely that the data subjects would be identifiable without either prior knowledge of them and/or access to Trust systems.

Details of the data subjects affected by the breach are being reviewed with by the Trust's Caldicott Guardian. The Right to be Informed will be considered against the Serious Harm Test with the outcomes and rationales clearly documented.

#### Training and compliance

This incident appears to have resulted from several rogue employees, who have failed to follow the training and guidance provided around the use of social media and handling patient data. These actions have resulted in a breach of the UK Data Protection Legislation.

The Trust has several policies in place around the handling of personal data and the use of social media, including the Social Media Policy, Information Governance Policy, Data Protection Policy and Confidentiality Code of Conduct. All staff are required to comply with these policies as a condition of

their employment with the Trust. Trust policies are readily available to all staff via the Trust's internal document library and Trust website.

The Trust also aligns with the Health Care Professions Council (HCPC) code of conduct.

Key messages from the Trust's policies are incorporated within both induction and mandatory Data Security Awareness and Social Media training.

Trust staff are required to complete the social media training every three years. At the point of the incident, 88.9% of the staff members involved were compliant with this training. Most having completed this training between February – April 2021. To date compliance with this training, for these individuals, stands at 92.6%.

The content of the data security awareness training is based upon guidance from NHS Digital and is required to be completed on an annual basis. The Trust monitors data security awareness training compliance at the information Governance Group (IGG) and Compliance and Risk Group (CRG).

The current total data security awareness training compliance of those involved is at 62%, with several staff having completed their mandatory training in May 2022. At the point of the incident, 38% of those staff involved were compliant with their mandatory data security awareness training.

The Trust strives to comply with the Data Security Protection Toolkit (DSPT) requirement of 95% overall compliance for data security training. Since Covid-19, the Trust has been operating under extreme pressure (Resource Escalation Action Plan or REAP Level 4) and remains at this level to date. Compliance with the 95% data security training requirement is featured on the Trust's DSPT improvement plan and several actions are being taken to try to address this.

## <u>Outcome</u>

Most of the disclosures involve the capturing and sharing of images taken directly from the MDT screen within the ambulance vehicles. The ability to take a photograph of a screen is challenging and very difficult to prevent, but the Trust is always looking to reduce or mitigate such risks.

The information shared was available to those individuals legitimately through their roles within the Trust. That their actions in sharing this information with others via a non-Trust social media platform have breached Data Protection Legislation, Trust policies, the Trust's values and potentially their contracts of employment, which require staff to handle personal data appropriately and securely.

The individual outcomes for each member of staff involved is being determined by the disciplinary panel. To date, several of the cases have now closed with outcomes including

The remaining few have hearings are scheduled to take place and due to be completed by the end of October 2022.

It should be noted that following the staff briefing message from the Trust's CEO, some high-level articles around the suspension of staff over social media misuse did feature on a few online news websites.

The Trust continues to work with the relevant registration and regulatory bodies, such as the Health Care Professions Council (HCPC) and Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) to support their investigations.

### **Proposed Actions**

- Following the review of data subjects with the Trust's Caldicott Guardian, any individuals
  being notified about the breach will need to have their details checked against the Summary
  Care Record / National Spine, prior to contact. This is to take into account any changes of
  health status (e.g. if a patient has since passed away) and to ensure that we are using the
  correct registered contact details.
- Social media is a rapidly changing environment, and the Trust should continue with the current review and strengthening of its Social Media Policy.
- 3. The Trust should continue to raise awareness / training with all staff around workplace culture.

4. Consideration should be given to undertaking an access audit on the records/patient details that have been disclosed: 01/REA/22/000076

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## Appendix 1 – Risk Matrix

Data	Data source	Types of data	Likelihood of	Potential	Notes	Impact on	Impact on	Total	Right to be Informed decision
Subject		disclosed	identification	detriment	r'e Conv	score -	score -		and rationale
			(external)	2010	3 COPY	identification	detriment		
1	MDT	Reason for call	3	3	Several potential	Increase - 4	None - 3	12	
		Type of patient	lef no	): 01	identifiers disclosed, which, if coupled with	2/000	076		
		Time of incident			open-source				
		Full location	lama	100	intelligence, makes				
		(potentially	Idille.		identification of the				
		address)			data subject more likely.				
2	MDT	Age	ate:	$3 \cap 10$	Several potential	Increase - 4	None - 4	16	
		Gender	alt.	OU/U	identifiers disclosed,				
		Reason for call			which, if coupled with				
		Full location			open-source				
		(potentially			intelligence, makes				
		address)			identification of the				
					data subject more likely.				
3	MDT	Age	4	3	Several potential	Increase - 4	None - 3	12	
		Gender			identifiers disclosed,				
		Time of incident			which, if coupled with				
		Reason for call			open-source				
		Full location			intelligence, makes				
		(potentially			identification of the				
		address)			data subject more likely.				
4	MDT	Full name	3	3	Several potential	None - 3	None - 3	9	
		Age			identifiers disclosed. It				
		Gender			is likely that one would				
		Reason for call			require some				
					knowledge of the data				

		1	1			Г			1
					subject and/or area to				
					be able to identify them				
					from the information				
				oto	disclosed.				
5	MDT	Reason for call	l€uut	15 LCI	Full location disclosed	None - 3	None - 3	9	
		Time of incident			but no other person				
		Full location	1 -5	- 01	identifiable information.	0/000	070		
		(potentially	ter no	) U I	This would make it	Z/UUU	U/D		
		address)			trickier to identify the		) .		
		II.		10	data subject concerned.				
6	MDT	Age	lame:	3	Several potential	Increase - 4	None - 3	12	
		Gender			identifiers disclosed,				
		Reason for call	1 - 4	0010	which, if coupled with				
		Full location	late: .	3070	open-source				
		(potentially	ato.	0,0	intelligence, makes				
		address)			identification of the				
					data subject more likely.				
7	MDT	Partial CAD	2	3	Partial identifiers	None - 2	None - 3	6	
		number			disclosed. One would				
		Reason for call			either require access to				
		Time of incident			the Trust's systems or				
		Partial location			prior knowledge of the				
		(potentially			data subject to further				
		address)			identify them.				
8	MDT	Partial CAD	3	3	Limited and identifiers	None - 3	None - 3	9	
		number			disclosed. One would				
		Reason for call			either require access to				
		Time of incident			the Trust's systems or				
		Full location			prior knowledge of the				
		(potentially			data subject to further				
		address)			identify them.				
9	Unconfirmed	Full location	2	3	Limited information	None - 2	None - 3	6	

		/			disales ad as alsia a ta				
		(potentially			disclosed making it				
		address)			difficult to identify the				
					data subject without				
			00000		access to Trust systems.				
10	PCR	Full CAD	(Eaut	<b>Ste</b>	Limited information	None - 2	None - 4	8	
		number			disclosed making it				
		Reason for call	- £	. 04	difficult to identify the	2/000	070		
		Patient's pet	let no	)	data subject without	ア/しけし	U/b		
					access to Trust systems.	_, 0 0 0	0,0		
11	Photograph	Image of a	3	4 1	The image has been	None - 3	None - 4	12	
		patient in a	ıame	] [ ] ( , (	taken from some				
		hospital bed.	01110		distance, so it would be				
		Their face can	1	0010	difficult for a member				
		be seen.	ate: 3	301/0	of the public to identify				
			ato.	00/0	the individual.				
	1								

#### Key:

Likelihood of identification	Score
Not possible (anonymous information)	1
Unlikely (pseudonymous information – would require access to information held on Trust systems)	2
Potential (limited potential identifiers disclosed – would require access to open-source intelligence)	3
Likely (multiple potential identifiers disclosed – would require access to open-source intelligence)	4

Occurred (data subject is fully identifiable) 5	
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Potential detriment Requesters Copy	Score	
No adverse effect Ref no: 01/RFA/22/00	ስሰ	7
Potentially some minor adverse effect	2	"
Potentially some adverse effect lame: CO	3	
High risk of pain/suffering	4	
Adverse effect has occurred Date. 30/03/2022	5	

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