Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA)
Decision notice

Date: 13 July 2020
Public Authority: Cabinet Office
Address: 70 Whitehall
London
SW1A 2AS

Decision (including any steps ordered)

1. The complainant requested copies of an FOI Round Robin List maintained by the public authority and circulated to Whitehall departments. The public authority withheld the list relying on the exemptions at section 36(2)(b) FOIA.

2. The Commissioner’s decision is that:

   • The public authority was entitled to engage section 36(2)(b). However, in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemptions does not outweigh the public interest in disclosing the list.

   • The names of the applicants on the list are exempt on the basis of section 40(2) FOIA.

   • The public authority is in breach of section 17(1) FOIA for failing to issue a refusal notice in support of the application of section 36(2)(b) within 20 working days following the request.

3. The Commissioner requires the public authority to take the following steps to ensure compliance with the legislation.

   • Provide the complainant with copies of the FOI and EIR round robin list produced from 20 June 2018 to 20 August 2018 save the names of the applicants on the list which should be redacted.
4. The public authority must take these steps within 35 calendar days of the date of this decision notice. Failure to comply may result in the Commissioner making written certification of this fact to the High Court pursuant to section 54 of the Act and may be dealt with as a contempt of court.

Request and response

5. The complainant submitted a request for information to the public authority on 20 August 2018 in the following terms:

“I would like to request the following information:

For the past two months, I would like to request copies of the FOI Round Robin List, which is circulated, to my knowledge, by the Cabinet Office.

I would like to receive this information in an electronic format.”

6. The public authority responded on 13 September 2018 in the following terms: “Information you have requested is exempt under section 35(1)(a) and (b) of the Freedom of Information Act, which protects the formulation of policy and communications between Ministers. Disclosure would weaken Ministers’ ability to discuss controversial and sensitive topics free from premature public scrutiny. In addition, other exemptions would likely also apply on a case by case basis of requests detailed on these lists.” It also explained why it had concluded that the public interest favoured withholding the information.

7. The complainant requested an internal review of this decision on 12 November 2018.

8. The public authority wrote to the complainant with details of the outcome of the internal review on 10 July 2019 some 8 months after the review was requested. The public authority withdrew its application of the exemptions at section 35 and explained that it considered the requested information exempt from disclosure on the basis of the exemptions at section 36(2)(b) FOIA instead.
Scope of the case

9. The complainant had originally contacted the Commissioner on 5 May 2019 to complain about the time it was taking the public authority to carry out an internal review. The complaint was progressed to a substantive investigation on 24 June 2019. During the course of the investigation, the complainant informed the Commissioner that the public authority had finally provided her with details of the outcome of its internal review on 10 July 2019.

10. As part of its submissions to the Commissioner on 21 January 2020, the public authority advised that it reserved the right to invoke section 40(2) FOIA\(^1\) to cover the personal information contained within the round robin list should the Commissioner not uphold the application of section 36(2)(b).

11. However, at the time of drafting this notice, the Cabinet Office had not responded to the Commissioner’s correspondence of 26 February 2020 requesting its full submission in support of the application of section 40(2). The deadline for the public authority to respond to those enquiries expired on 10 March 2020.

12. The focus of the investigation therefore was to consider whether the public authority was entitled to rely on sections 36(2)(b) FOIA as the basis for withholding the requested information (the withheld information). The Commissioner has referred to the complainant’s submissions at the relevant part of her analysis below.

13. However, given the Commissioner has a duty to ensure that personal data is not processed in contravention of Data Protection legislation, she has also considered whether some of the withheld information namely, the names of the applicants on the round robin list, should be withheld on the basis of the exemption at section 40(2).

14. For the avoidance of doubt, the Commissioner does not share the public authority’s view that the text of the information requests also constitute personal data within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 2018. Neither does the Commissioner share the view that applying section 40(2) would remove a significant percentage of the list’s information and

\(^1\) A public authority may rely on section 40(2) if it considers that the requested information constitutes the personal data of individuals other than the applicant.
the key information necessary to contextualise the remaining information.

Reasons for decision

Withheld information

15. The withheld information, namely, the FOI and EIR round robin list produced from 20 June 2018 to 20 August 2018, includes the text of the request, the name of the applicant, the receiving department(s) and advice by the Cabinet Office Clearing House on how to respond to the request.

16. According to the public authority, the round robin list registers to government departments FOI requests that may have been received by other departments and also offers advice on how to respond, though departments, as public authorities in their own right, are ultimately responsible for how they respond. The list, issued daily to Whitehall departments, comprises of FOI requests across departments that either (a) are identical requests that have been sent to multiple departments or (b) are asking about sensitive subjects that have been reported to the Cabinet Office Clearing House. Once a request is added to the list, other government departments who receive the same request also notify Clearing House.

Application of section 36(2)(b) FOIA

17. The Commissioner initially considered whether the public authority was entitled to rely on section 36(2)(b).

18. The relevant provisions in section 36 state²:

   "Information to which this section applies is exempt information if, in the reasonable opinion of a qualified person, disclosure of the information under this Act—

   b) would, or would be likely to, inhibit-

   i. the free and frank provision of advice, or

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² The full text of section 36 can be found here: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/section/36
ii. the free and frank exchange of views for the purposes of deliberation

19. Both exemptions can only be engaged on the basis of the reasonable opinion of a Qualified Person. The opinion should be provided at the time of the request prior to issuing a refusal notice to an applicant under the FOIA. The Qualified Person who issued the opinion in this case was the Minister for the Constitution, Chloe Smith MP.

20. The Qualified Person’s opinion was sought by officials on 20 January 2020 and her opinion was provided on 21 January 2020. Clearly, the opinion should have first been obtained in order for the public authority to be able to rely on section 36(2)(b) which it did 6 months prior on 10 July 2019. Consequently, the Commissioner finds that the public authority was not entitled to rely on section 36(2)(b) when it initially did so in July 2019.

21. However, further to the binding decision of the Upper Tribunal in McInerney v IC and Department for Education³, the public authority has the right to claim any exemption or exception for the first time before the Commissioner. Therefore, when the public authority provided its submission to the Commissioner on 21 January 2020, it was entitled to apply the exemptions at section 36(2)(b) to the withheld information.

22. The Commissioner would however like to note her concern that the public authority originally applied the exemptions in its refusal of the request on 10 July 2019 when in fact it was legally prevented from doing so at the time in the absence of the Qualified Person’s opinion.

23. The Commissioner would also like to note that officials recommended the application of both the exemptions at sections 36(2)(b) and (c) to the Qualified Person when in fact their submissions were in support of the application of section 36(2)(b) alone. The Commissioner assumes that this was an error on their part and that they were seeking to rely only on section 36(2)(b).

Is the Qualified Person’s opinion reasonable?

24. In determining whether the exemption is engaged, the Commissioner must consider whether the Qualified Person’s (QP) opinion was a

reasonable one. In doing so the Commissioner has considered all of the relevant factors including:

- Whether the prejudice relates to the specific subsection of section 36(2) that is being claimed. If the prejudice or inhibition envisaged is not related to the specific subsection, the opinion is unlikely to be reasonable.
- The nature of the information. Whether it concerns an important issue which there needs to be a free and frank exchange of views or provision of advice.
- The QP’s knowledge of, or involvement in, the issue.

25. Further, in determining whether the opinion is a reasonable one, the Commissioner takes the approach that if the opinion is in accordance with reason and not irrational or absurd – in short, if it is an opinion that a reasonable person could hold – then it is reasonable. This is not the same as saying that it is the only reasonable opinion that could be held on the subject. The QP’s opinion is not rendered unreasonable simply because other people may have come to a different (and equally reasonable) conclusion. It is only unreasonable if it is an opinion that no reasonable person in the QP’s position could hold. The QP’s opinion does not have to be the most reasonable opinion that could be held; it only has to be a reasonable opinion.

The Qualified Person’s opinion

26. According to the public authority, the intention of the round robin list is to ensure that government departments are aware of those issues that have a broad applicability across government to ensure consistency of approach across departments and ultimately to assist in providing the best possible advice to applicants while also ensuring that the FOIA is applied correctly. As the list is updated and issued on a daily basis, the information and advice it contains is constantly changing to take account of evolving policy options and advice. The list itself is an aid memoire to departments devoid of the fuller advice and discussions that occurs daily between departments and the Clearing House in other correspondence and advice (much of which is often verbal).

27. The QP considers that disclosing the round robin list requested by the complainant devoid of the subtleties and contextuality of these other discussions would likely lead to a misinterpretation of much of the advice, which in turn would be likely to inhibit the free and frank provision of that advice and the free and frank exchange of views for the purposes of deliberation. Although submission to the QP states that a copy of the withheld information in full was attached to the submission,
the public authority subsequently informed the Commissioner that in fact, the QP was provided with an example round robin list not the full list within the scope of the request. This is because daily versions of the list would be mostly identical apart from the daily additions.

28. Reiterating the QP’s opinion, the public authority explained that the round robin list is meant as an immediate, practical tool for central government departments, offering them advice on often sensitive or technical FOI issues as that advice arises and changes over the timeframe of individual cases. The purpose is both one of awareness and ensuring consistency of approach as far as individual departmental circumstances allow with the ultimate aim of providing the best and most accurate advice possible to applicants.

29. Furthermore, the free and frank provision of advice, and the fuller discussions and communications between departments that accompanies it, is offered with an immediacy that acknowledges that such advice may well change (sometimes significantly) as opinions are formed, further specialised advice is sought and senior sign-off of approach is obtained.

30. The likely upshot of the public misinterpreting the round robin list would be a severe inhibition in the free and frank exchange of views for the purposes of deliberation, as officials would only add advice to the list when they were absolutely sure of their final position and where this was supported by contextual information. However, this would make the round robin list incredibly unwieldy as a document and, more importantly, unresponsive to the day-to-day needs of evolving situational advice between departments.

Complainant’s position

31. The complainant’s submissions challenging the engagement of section 36(2) are summarised below.

32. It is not clear who the QP is and this should be assessed by the Commissioner.

33. The QP’s opinion did not meet the threshold of ‘reasonableness.’ If the withheld information only consists of relatively neutral statements, then it may not be reasonable to think that its disclosure could inhibit the provision of advice or the exchange of views.

34. Taking into consideration the timing of the request as well as the nature of the round robin list, it is not clear how release of the withheld information would prejudice or inhibit Ministers and officials and from what exactly.
Commissioner’s considerations

35. The Commissioner finds that the Minister for the Constitution, Chloe Smith MP is a QP by virtue of section 36(5)(a) FOIA.

36. The Commissioner has been guided on the interpretation of the phrase ‘would prejudice’ or ‘would be likely to prejudice’ by a number of Information Tribunal decisions. The Tribunal has been clear that this phrase means that there are two possible limbs upon which a prejudice based exemption can be engaged; i.e. either prejudice ‘would’ occur or prejudice ‘would be likely to’ occur.

37. With regard to likely to prejudice, the Information Tribunal in John Connor Press Associates Limited v The Information Commissioner confirmed that “the chance of prejudice being suffered should be more than a hypothetical possibility; there must have been a real and significant risk”.

38. With regard to the alternative limb of ‘would prejudice’, the Tribunal in Hogan v Oxford City Council & The Information Commissioner commented that “...this second limb of the test places a stronger evidential burden on the public authority to discharge”, and the likelihood of the prejudice claimed should be “more probable than not”.

39. The QP considers that disclosure would be likely to prejudice the interests in section 36(2)(b).

40. As mentioned, the Commissioner is of the view that in assessing the QP’s opinion, ‘reasonableness’ should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. An opinion that a reasonable person in the QP’s position could hold would suffice. The opinion is not rendered unreasonable simply because other people may have come to a different and equally reasonable conclusion.

41. The Commissioner considers that the exemptions at section 36(2)(b) are about the processes that may be inhibited, rather than what is in the information. The issue is whether disclosure would inhibit the processes

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4 Section 36(5)(a) states that a qualified person in relation to information held by a government department in the charge of a Minister of the Crown, means any Minister of the Crown.

5 EA/2005/0005

6 EA/2005/0026 & 0030
of providing advice or exchanging views. In order to engage the exemption, the information requested does not necessarily have to contain views and advice that are in themselves notably free and frank. On the other hand, if the information only consists of relatively neutral statements, then it may not be reasonable to think that its disclosure could inhibit the provision of advice or the exchange of views. Therefore, although it may be harder to engage the exemptions if the information in scope consists of neutral statements, circumstances might dictate that the information should be withheld in order not to inhibit the free and frank provision of advice and the free and frank exchange of views. This will depend on the facts of each case.

42. The Commissioner considers that the nature of the advice offered by Cabinet Office Clearing House on the round robin list within the scope of the request is largely as would be expected from them to departments handling identical and/or sensitive subject matter requests. However, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there is a real and significant risk that officials would be less candid in future when offering similar advice should they consider that advice given in relation to the handling of certain types of FOI requests could be disclosed within a short period of time. The severity and extent of the impact this is likely to have on the quality of such advice is however another matter. In addition, the likelihood of the public misinterpreting much of the advice has been mentioned repeatedly. How exactly the public could misinterpret the advice has not been explained however. Both of these factors are not significant in assessing the reasonableness or otherwise of the QP’s opinion in the circumstances of this case. They are however relevant in assessing the balance of the public interest which the Commissioner has considered below.

43. The age of the withheld information does not significantly undermine the QP’s opinion in the Commissioner’s view. The Clearing House advice in particular could be relevant to future requests for information.

44. In light of the above, the Commissioner finds that the public authority was entitled to engage section 36(2)(b).

Public interest test

45. As mentioned, the exemption is however subject to the public interest test set out in section 2(2)(b) FOIA. Therefore, the Commissioner must also consider whether in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the withheld information.
The complainant’s position

46. The complainant’s submissions in support of the public interest in disclosing the withheld information are summarised below.

47. The complainant says she has concerns about how the FOI round robin list operates and how and why applicants end up on the list. More specifically, she says her concerns mainly relate to the ‘applicant blind’ principle and what categories of applicants are likely to end up on the list.

48. The complainant is also concerned that the public authority is dictating to other government departments how they should respond to requests and the public deserves to know and understand how and why they are doing this.

49. She considers that disclosing the withheld information would enable the public to see how the public authority treats FOI requests and scrutinise their processes.

Public authority’s position

50. The public authority provided very little by way of public interest submissions to the Commissioner. It simply stated that it remained unconvinced as to the public interest in disclosing the withheld information as it would add very little to the general public understanding of how central government operates or responds to FOI requests.

51. In its correspondence of 10 July 2019 to the complainant setting out details of the outcome of its internal review, the public authority acknowledged that there is a general public interest in disclosure of information and recognised that openness in Government may increase public interest in and engagement with the Government. The information requested may deepen public understanding and so lead to more informed public consideration of the Government’s handling of such policy in general.

52. However, in favour of maintaining the exemption, the public authority argued that it is strongly in the public interest that Ministers and Officials are able to receive and impart free and frank advice. This advice must be detailed, frank and candid if it is to be of value. For this to occur, the adviser must be free of any inhibitions that might interfere with their ability to give full, frank and, sometimes, unwelcome advice.

53. Furthermore, Ministers and officials must also have confidence that, in proffering advice, the adviser has not been inhibited by extraneous concerns. Such concerns necessarily include the concern that the advice
will be exposed prematurely to public scrutiny or comments. Ministers and Officials must be able to rely on the quality of the advice.

**Balance of the public interest**

54. The Commissioner’s consideration of the balance of the public interest is set out below.

55. If the Commissioner finds that the qualified person’s opinion was reasonable, she will consider the weight of that opinion in the public interest test. This means that the Commissioner accepts that a reasonable opinion has been expressed that prejudice or inhibition would, or would be likely to occur (as she has in this case), but she will go on to consider the severity, extent and frequency of that prejudice or inhibition in forming her own assessment of whether the public interest test dictates disclosure.

56. There will always be a general public interest in transparency. More specifically, there is a strong public interest in disclosing a list which includes the names of applicants as well as the text of their FOI request and advice from the Cabinet Office to departments on handling these requests. Disclosure would, amongst other things, assist the public in assessing whether requests have been included on the list in line with the public authority’s criteria, whether Clearing House is dictating to departments how to respond to FOI requests or offering advice in an expected manner and, whether the advice offered and the general handling of requests on the list is influenced by the identity of an applicant when it is not necessary do so, such as in relation to the application of section 14 FOIA⁷.

57. The Commissioner does not consider that there is a strong public interest in withholding the round robin list within the scope of the complainant’s request. The Commissioner does not consider that publishing the list would severely impact on the quality of advice provided by Clearing House to departments. Whilst officials could become more guarded with their advice as a consequence, she is not persuaded that this would interfere in any significant way with their ability to provide sound advice which is primarily what departments require in order to provide an FOI and/or EIR compliant response to applicants.

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⁷ The identity of an applicant would be relevant when relying on some provisions in the FOIA such as section 14 - Repeated and vexatious requests.
58. As mentioned, the public authority has not explained how the public might misinterpret the advice to departments. However, the Commissioner does not consider that public misinterpretation of the request is a decisive factor in tilting the balance of the public interest in favour of maintaining the application of section 36(2)(b) in this case. The fact that the public authority is retaining the FOI and EIR round robin list is more likely to be a cause for concern for some members of the public in the first place (which is not to suggest that there are no legitimate business reasons for retaining the list). The complainant has suggested that this is primarily the reason for her request. In the Commissioner’s view, the public is less likely to misinterpret the advice from Clearing House and the rest of the withheld information. In any event, the public authority could contextualise any part of the withheld information it considers is likely to be misinterpreted by the public before releasing it.

59. In light of the above, the Commissioner considers that the public interest in disclosing the withheld information outweighs the public interest in maintaining the exemption.

Application of section 40(2)

60. As mentioned, the Commissioner has also considered whether the names of the applicants on the round robin list should be withheld on the basis of the exemption at section 40(2).

61. Section 40(2) provides that information is exempt from disclosure if it is the personal data of an individual other than the requester and where one of the conditions listed in section 40(3A)(3B) or 40(4A) is satisfied.

62. In this case the relevant condition is contained in section 40(3A)(a). This applies where the disclosure of the information to any member of the public would contravene any of the principles relating to the processing of personal data (‘the DP principles’), as set out in Article 5 of the General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’).

63. The first step for the Commissioner is to determine whether the names of the applicants constitute personal data as defined by the Data Protection Act 2018 (‘DPA’). If it is not personal data then section 40 of FOIA cannot apply.

64. Secondly, and only if the Commissioner is satisfied that the requested information is personal data, she must establish whether disclosure of that data would breach any of the DP principles.

65. Section 3(2) of the DPA defines personal data as: ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual’.
66. In the circumstances of this case, the Commissioner is satisfied that the names of the applicants both relate to and identify the individuals concerned. This information therefore falls within the definition of ‘personal data’ in section 3(2) of the DPA.

67. The fact that information constitutes the personal data of an identifiable living individual does not automatically exclude it from disclosure under FOIA. The second element of the test is to determine whether disclosure would contravene any of the DP principles. The most relevant DP principle in this case is principle (a).

**Would disclosure contravene principle (a)?**

68. Article 5(1)(a) of the GDPR states that: ‘Personal data shall be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject’.

69. In the case of an FOIA request, the personal data is processed when it is disclosed in response to the request. This means that the information can only be disclosed if to do so would be lawful, fair and transparent.

70. In order to be lawful, one of the lawful bases listed in Article 6(1) of the GDPR must apply to the processing. It must also be generally lawful.

**Lawful processing: Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR**

71. The Commissioner considers that the lawful basis most applicable is basis 6(1)(f) which states:

‘processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child’

8 Article 6(1) goes on to state that: “Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks”.

However, section 40(8) FOIA (as amended by Schedule 19 Paragraph 58(8) DPA) provides that: “In determining for the purposes of this section whether the lawfulness principle in Article 5(1)(a) of the GDPR would be contravened by the disclosure of information, Article 6(1) of the GDPR (lawfulness) is to be read as if the second sub-paragraph (dis-applying the legitimate interests gateway in relation to public authorities) were omitted”.

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Reference: FS50841228
72. In considering the application of Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR in the context of a request for information under FOIA, it is necessary to consider the following three-part test:-

   i) **Legitimate interest test**: Whether a legitimate interest is being pursued in the request for information;

   ii) **Necessity test**: Whether disclosure of the information is necessary to meet the legitimate interest in question;

   iii) **Balancing test**: Whether the above interests override the legitimate interest(s) or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.

73. The Commissioner considers that the test of ‘necessity’ under stage (ii) must be met before the balancing test under stage (iii) is applied.

**Legitimate interests**

74. In considering any legitimate interest(s) in the disclosure of the requested information under FOIA, the Commissioner recognises that such interest(s) can include broad general principles of accountability and transparency for their own sakes, as well as case-specific interests.

75. Further, a wide range of interests may be legitimate interests. They can be the requester’s own interests or the interests of third parties, and commercial interests as well as wider societal benefits. They may be compelling or trivial, but trivial interests may be more easily overridden in the balancing test.

76. Given the complainant’s concerns, the Commissioner considers that there is a legitimate interest in revealing the names of the applicants in order to inform the debate on whether the public authority is not applying the applicant blind principle to requests when it should. However, the Commissioner does not consider that there is a particularly compelling legitimate interest in the disclosure of the names of the applicants in order to inform the public about the content of the round robin list. Redacting the names of applicants from the list would still leave the text of the requests along with Clearing House advice which would largely reveal whether the same request has been handled differently on separate occasions and the rationale for doing so.

**Is disclosure necessary?**

77. ‘Necessary’ means more than desirable but less than indispensable or absolute necessity. Accordingly, the test is one of reasonable necessity which involves the consideration of alternative measures, and so a measure would not be necessary if the legitimate aim could be achieved...
by something less. Disclosure under FOIA must therefore be the least restrictive means of achieving the legitimate aim in question.

78. In the Commissioner’s view, disclosure of the names of the applicants would not significantly inform the public about how the public authority is handling certain types of FOI requests beyond the text of the requests themselves and the advice provided by Clearing House to departments. It is clearly not the least restrictive means of informing the debate.

79. Consequently, the Commissioner has concluded that disclosure of the names would not be lawful and therefore article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR is not met. Disclosure of the names would therefore breach the first data protection principle and thus such information is exempt from disclosure on the basis of section 40(2) of FOIA.

**Procedural Matters**

80. By virtue of section 17(1) FOIA, a public authority is required to issue a refusal notice notifying an applicant of the exemption(s) the public authority is relying on to withhold requested information within 20 working days following the date the request was received.

81. The Commissioner considers that the public authority issued an invalid refusal notice to the complainant in support of the application of section 36(2)(b) on 10 July 2019 nearly a year after she originally submitted her request and nearly 8 months following her request for an internal review. Although a valid refusal notice in support of the application of section 36(2)(b) was never actually issued to the complainant, the Commissioner considers that if one was provided, it could not have been issued prior to 21 January 2020 when the Qualified Person gave her opinion further to the application of section 36(2)(b).

82. The Commissioner therefore finds the public authority in breach of section 17(1) FOIA.
Other Matters

83. Although there is no statutory time limit for completing internal reviews in the FOIA, the Commissioner considers that, as a matter of good practice, internal reviews should generally take no longer than 20 working days and in exceptional circumstances 40 working days.

84. There is simply no justifiable reason in the Commissioner’s view for the public authority to have taken nearly 8 months to carry out the internal review.
Right of appeal

85. Either party has the right to appeal against this decision notice to the First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights). Information about the appeals process may be obtained from:

First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights)  
GRC & GRP Tribunals,  
PO Box 9300,  
LEICESTER,  
LE1 8DJ

Tel: 0300 1234504  
Fax: 0870 739 5836  
Email: grc@justice.gov.uk  
Website: [www.justice.gov.uk/tribunals/general-regulatory-chamber](http://www.justice.gov.uk/tribunals/general-regulatory-chamber)

86. If you wish to appeal against a decision notice, you can obtain information on how to appeal along with the relevant forms from the Information Tribunal website.

87. Any Notice of Appeal should be served on the Tribunal within 28 (calendar) days of the date on which this decision notice is sent.

Signed…………………………………………………………

Terna Waya  
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