

Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR)

Decision notice

Date: 7 November 2024

Public Authority: Department for Science, Innovation & Technology

Address: 100 Parliament Street
London
SW1A 2BQ

Decision (including any steps ordered)

1. The complainant requested information from the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology ("DSIT") relating to proposed telecommunication mast sites for the Shared Rural Network in Scotland.
2. DSIT cited regulation 12(5)(a) (International relations, defence, national security or public safety) of the EIR to withhold the information.
3. The Commissioner's decision is that DSIT correctly applied regulation 12(5)(a) of the EIR to withhold the information and the public interest favours maintaining the exception.
4. The Commissioner does not require any steps to be taken.

Request and response

5. On 12 January 2024, the complainant made the following request for information to DSIT:

"DSIT is supporting the Shared Rural Network (SRN) scheme by funding the TotalNotSpot (TNS) element of the SRN scheme.

To scope and illustrate the number of new masts required to meet the '2020 coverage obligations' in the TNS contract, the participating mobile operators have been provided with plan showing:

the TNS areas where coverage is required and nominal locations which radio software has determined will provide coverage across the area to the required level.

Could you please provide me with a list of the nominal locations of these publicly-funded masts in Scotland, either by National Grid Reference or Lat/Long co-ordinates. I believe there are 320 nominal locations, but not all will need to be used."

6. DSIT responded on 9 February 2024, stating:

"Information on planning applications that have been submitted to Local Planning Authorities is available on Local Authority websites."

7. That same day, the complainant replied to DSIT and said:

"Thanks for that, but you have not answered my question. I asked for a list of locations (grid references) associated with the plan. Not an update on the current number of planning applications.

To clarify further, and hopefully avoid nugatory work at your end, this will likely be a list of grid references on a spreadsheet, or on a small collection of spreadsheets. The title will be something like 'Initial Radio Plan' and it will date from around 2020. It was used to justify a government grant of £354.8M to the SRN programme."

8. On 8 March 2024 DSIT responded to the complainant and extended the deadline for its response in order to consider the public interest test under section 38 (health and safety) and section 43 (commercial interests) of FOIA.
9. On 10 April 2024, DSIT responded to the complainant - under the EIR. DSIT said that it held the information but that it was withholding it on the basis of regulation 12(5)(a) of the EIR.
10. On 20 May 2024, DSIT upheld this decision at internal review.

Scope of the case

11. The complainant contacted the Commissioner on 24 May 2024 to complain about the way their request for information had been handled.
12. The Commissioner contacted DSIT and requested its submissions on the matter and a copy of the withheld information. DSIT duly provided these to the Commissioner and, during the course of his investigation, DSIT answered further questions put to it by the Commissioner.
13. The Commissioner considers that the scope of his investigation is to establish whether DSIT is entitled to withhold the requested information under regulation 12(5)(a) of the EIR.
14. It should be noted that the Commissioner's role is to consider the application of any exceptions (including the balance of the public interest test) on the basis of how matters stood at the time the request was first responded to by DSIT on 9 February 2024.

Reasons for decision

Regulation 12(5)(a) – international relations, defence, national security, or public safety.

15. Regulation 12(5)(a) of the EIR states that information is exempt if its disclosure would adversely affect international relations, defence, national security, or public safety.
16. To engage regulation 12(5)(a), a public authority must demonstrate that disclosing the requested information would have an adverse effect on at least one of the following interests: international relations, defence, national security, or public safety. This sets a high threshold; the adverse effect has to be more probable than not that the alleged harm would occur if the information was released. It is not enough to show that disclosure could or might have an adverse effect.
17. A range of information could be exempt from disclosure on the basis of regulation 12(5)(a), such as:
 - details about systems designed to protect public safety,
 - material identifying individuals who might be targeted as a result of disclosure,
 - details about potential targets for terrorists, and

- information that would undermine the security of particular establishments, operations or infrastructure.
18. There is a significant overlap in the interests protected by regulation 12(5)(a). For example, if the disclosure of information endangers a piece of the UK's infrastructure, this could harm both public safety and national security.
 19. In this case, DSIT considers that disclosure of the information requested would adversely affect national security and public safety.
 20. The concept of "public safety" is readily understood so it is not defined in the EIR. In broad terms the Commissioner's guidance¹ states that this limb of the exception allows a public authority to withhold information if disclosure would result in hurt or injury to a member of the public. It can be used to protect the public as a whole, a specific group, or one individual who would be exposed to some danger as a result of the disclosure.
 21. "National security" is also not defined in the EIR. The Commissioner's guidance explains that an exception for national security would apply to information which could assist a terrorist attack which would put the public in serious danger. The guidance also states that relatively mundane environmental information about civil infrastructure could also be of use to terrorists and therefore could attract the exception provided by regulation 12(5)(a). As set out in his guidance, the Commissioner is mindful that terrorists can be highly motivated and may go to great lengths to gather intelligence. This means there may be grounds for withholding what seems harmless information on the basis that it may assist terrorists when pieced together with other information they may obtain. Further, his guidance states that the threat to national security does not have to be immediate. It is not necessary to show that disclosing the information would lead to a direct or immediate threat to the UK.
 22. During the course of his investigation the Commissioner has viewed the withheld information. It is a dataset/list of the nominal locations by the eastings/northings coordinates of proposed telecommunication mast sites in Scotland.

¹ <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/foi/freedom-of-information-and-environmental-information-regulations/regulation-12-5-a-international-relations-defence-national-security-or-public-safety/>

23. DSIT argue that disclosure of the withheld information could potentially lead to outcomes which would impact on national security and public safety.
24. DSIT began its submissions to the Commissioner by providing some overall context to the complainant's request. It explained that in general terms DSIT had "a concern with the location of actual telecommunication mast sites being identified, especially if that information is aggregated in totality or for large numbers of masts, and in a way which is readily accessible." It went on to explain that information aggregated in this way, in the hands of hostile state actors or other adversaries, would make it easier for them to locate and sabotage masts which formed part of the Shared Rural Network.
25. DSIT further explained that disclosing the actual mast location information in aggregate would lose the prevailing benefit that arises from this information being difficult to obtain and facilitate a hostile actor, therefore having an adverse effect on national security and public safety. DSIT argued that this is because such information is not available in the public domain. DSIT said that:

"in respect of the planning system, the way this information enters the public domain is piecemeal and disaggregated. It requires time, trouble and effort to obtain it and to aggregate it. This offers significant protection against the threats identified in terms of making execution of an attack more difficult. There is therefore a significant benefit to not disclosing an aggregated list of actual mast data, and that is why the department doesn't publish that and why the data are treated confidentially when aggregated."

26. DSIT then further explained in its submissions that it appreciated that the complainant has not asked for a list of *actual* mast sites, rather he had asked for a list of *proposed* mast sites from 2020 used to justify a funding decision. DSIT said about the complainant's request:

"Whilst the degree of facilitation disclosure of the requested list would offer is less than that which an accurate and up-to-date list of actual sites would offer, nevertheless, this facilitation would increase the risk to national security, defence and public safety, significantly and therefore adversely. Moreover, that facilitation would occur if the information were disclosed, as it would enter the public domain and immediately serve to offer that degree of facilitation or ultimately would on further dissemination, of if an agent for a hostile actor requested it.

And,

"We accept that not all of the proposed sites that were on the requested list have been realised or will be realised, and indeed in many cases it is almost certain they will not be realised. However, there still remain by our assessment at least [number redacted by the Commissioner] proposed mast sites on the list which may yet become actual sites (or near to which actual sites will be created). Thus, to a substantial extent, the list requested is accurate or helpfully so in identifying an appreciable number of actual sites."

And,

"There are some movements to all of these sites (as is normal in mobile infrastructure deployment), this may make the exact coordinates redundant but would still give the recipient highly accurate data to try and find the [number redacted by Commissioner] sites that remain (which are likely to be nearby) which would present a security risk. A release of the requested data by the department would be more damaging due to the credibility associated with its 'official' status and would represent an even greater security risk if all the information were to be aggregated into a single dataset, subsequently published and compared alongside the information the requestor holds. The Commissioner has recently made a decision on the same matter with regard to the same information released by NatureScot."

27. DSIT therefore explained that if the withheld information was disclosed - in aggregated readily accessible form for a large number of proposed mast sites - it would provide a hostile actor or other adversary a checklist of places to check for/locate and sabotage masts which form part of the Shared Rural Network (or to pre-position equipment and technology to sabotage prospective mast locations at a later date), and this would adversely affect national security.
28. DSIT further explained that "the successful sabotage of the Shared Rural Network would have both first order consequences for citizens who will likely face significant disruption because of interrupted mobile network access, and second order consequences for public and emergency services in rural areas whose operational effectiveness would be substantially diminished by a loss of mobile connectivity. Citizens living in remote rural locations who are vulnerable or isolated will be amongst those most impacted by these consequences".
29. In terms of the plausibility of a malicious attack, the Commissioner notes DSIT's evidence that:

"Published aggregate information on the location of mast sites may be used in conjunction with frequency band information to facilitate the jamming of radio signals to inhibit communication over a targeted geographic area. Similarly, this information could also be used in

combination with the misuse of Global Titles to track users of mobile networks. The risks posed by the misuse of Global Titles are set out in Ofcom's recent consultation on 'Global Titles and Mobile Network Security'².

30. As noted by DSIT in its submissions, the Commissioner has also taken into account recent guidance from the National Protective Security Agency (NPSA)³ which sets out that: "sabotage activities, on behalf of or for the benefit of a foreign power, may target a broad range of UK infrastructure, critical assets and the supply chains."
31. The complainant argued that there was little risk due to DSIT's "strategy of siting all these masts in uninhabited areas of the Highlands." The complainant's view is that: "The notion - that 'foreign agents' might use the planned locations of mobile phone masts in uninhabited regions of Scotland to attack them - is of course ludicrous. Far from threatening our security, if these masts were disconnected, few people would even notice !"
32. However, the Commissioner's view is that promoting the dissemination of a detailed list of proposed mast sites through a response to an information request would provide significant intelligence to anyone seeking to undermine the UK's national security. This would increase the risk of a terrorist attack. Even if the disclosure would not necessarily result in an attack on a particular site it could be used to build up a bigger picture. Disclosure would allow terrorists to compare any information they had gleaned about similar sites to determine which was most vulnerable or to better understand the potential harm that could be caused by attacks on different sites. This could be used to inform a decision about which site to target. In the Commissioner's view disclosure would give encouragement to those with ill intent or help them plan an attack.
33. In addition DSIT explained that disclosure of the withheld information would adversely affect public safety. This was because 'other adversaries' motivated to participate in disruptive activism may vandalise, damage or destroy mast sites or harass mobile network employees/site workers and landlords. Citizens would be put at risk or harmed during or as a result of attacks (especially from uncontrolled

² <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/phones-and-broadband/telecoms-infrastructure/consultation-global-titles-and-mobile-network-security/>

³ <https://www.npsa.gov.uk/countering-threat-sabotage-operations-uk-interests-and-national-security>

fires during arson attacks), and place emergency services workers who need to respond to incidents at risk of injury too. Loss of mobile connectivity caused by site damage could inhibit the public's ability to contact the emergency services via 999/112. As a result, this would adversely affect public safety.

34. In terms of the plausibility of a malicious attack, DSIT provided evidence to the Commissioner of attacks on mast sites conducted during the Covid-19 pandemic where up to 20 sites were attacked on a single weekend in 2020⁴, prosecutions of an organised group planning to attack mast sites in Scotland in 2021⁵, and the complete destruction of a mobile mast in a rural area in Derbyshire in 2023⁶.
35. The Commissioner's view is that the dissemination of a detailed list of proposed mast sites through a response to an information request would adversely affect public safety.
36. The complainant noted in his complaint to the Commissioner that DSIT's arguments were weakened by the fact that, in his view, the information sought was (or soon would be) already available in the public domain and that the proposed mast locations had significantly changed. He said:

"Once built, and potentially targets for activists, the mast sites will become available via the planning process, rates relief lists, or publicly available data lists like Mastdata.com. However, the sites requested come from a 2020 plan, about which the SRN has said this "Almost all proposed locations listed have either been removed from the plan (47) or moved location as a result of site investigations (148)."
37. The Commissioner asked DSIT to respond specifically to these points (and in addition to para 21 about planning applications above containing piecemeal and disaggregated information), DSIT responded as follows:
 - a. "As regards the rates relief lists, we do not recognise that that such lists are published containing accurate mast location information.

⁴ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-52281315>

⁵ <https://news.sky.com/story/conspiracy-theorists-dubbed-bonnie-and-clyde-guilty-of-plotting-to-destroy-5g-masts-and-encouraging-attacks-on-mps-12894359>

⁶ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-derbyshire-68107624>

- b. As regards the website www.mastdata.com, which is run by a private limited company. We understand from a mobile network operator that mastdata.com, for those who have access, provides information on mast planning applications. Specifically, whether these are approved or in determination (using information from Local Planning Authorities). The data does not detail if the site has or is going to be built but does contain a link to the actual planning application. The information displayed on the maps produced is similar to information that can be found through a Local Planning Authority's planning portal. However, this information is not freely publicly available and paragraph 2.6 of Mastdata's terms of use says "We may, at our discretion, refuse or terminate login or licence applications from individuals, organisations or companies that do not have a supporting interest in the UK telecoms industry."
- c. As regards the complainant's comment that "Almost all proposed locations listed have either been removed from the plan (47) or moved location as a result of site investigations (148)", DSIT said that it understood that the complainant obtained this information in an FOI response via another Government agency – NatureScot⁷ in February 2024. DSIT accepted that some of the proposed sites have not actually become sites but said that the requested information "would still give the recipient highly accurate data to try and find the [number redacted by Commissioner] sites that remain (which are likely to be nearby) which would present a security risk".
38. The Commissioner accepts as reasonable the view that the type of specific information the complainant has requested is not in the public domain. As regards the planning process, a site location may ultimately be disclosed as part of a planning process, but such isolated disclosure is likely to carry a lower security risk compared to the disclosure requested in this case - a single user-friendly dataset. The same applies to mastdata.com – as that information is not freely publicly available. NatureScot have published some information in response to an FOI request regarding proposed locations but this is now out of date. It is accepted that some of the proposed sites precisely identified in the requested information have not actually become sites but there still remain a significant number of proposed mast sites in the requested information which may become actual sites (or near to which actual

⁷ <https://srn.org.uk/statement-on-nature-scot-foi-response/>

sites will be created). It is also the case that because one body has published certain information, that does not mean that another body is therefore obliged to publish the same type of information. Each public authority is entitled to manage information as it considers is appropriate.

39. The complainant also advised the Commissioner during the course of his investigation that: "a CURRENT list of mast sites was published in June 2024" by Digital Mobile Spectrum Ltd (DMSL) (who manage the Shared Rural Network). Although this list was not available at the time the request was responded to in February 2024, the Commissioner felt it important to ask DSIT to comment on this list as this appeared to contradict DSIT's general argument that aggregated information about the location of actual telecommunication mast sites is not in the public domain.
40. DSIT's response was that this information is not in the public domain (e.g. on a website or in an official announcement) and the Commissioner accepts DSIT's view. The Commissioner understands that a data set was issued by DMSL to the John Muir Trust (who lead the consortium of NGO objectors). This dataset was shared in confidence, but was not for publication. DSIT said:

"The plan shared with the coalition in June 2024 was shared in the interests of collaboration. It was not published (as has been claimed by the complainant) nor was it shared for any use other than for them to feedback any concerns about locations of mast sites. The document was password protected, and the password sent via [redacted by Commissioner] a secure communication method to one individual at the John Muir Trust (JMT) for the purpose of "helping us collaboratively establish which masts should continue in the plan and which ones could be removed.

A separate email from DMSL to JMT reiterated that "the data was shared with the coalition of special interest groups on the basis that it was only to be used for the purpose of rating sites as part of the categorisation exercise and not to be published elsewhere."

The data sent to JMT was provided in confidence. JMT understood that the information was confidential and needed to be kept as such by those whose opinion it canvassed. It would have been given to the requester subject to quality of confidence if not expressly stated to be given in confidence. ...We therefore maintain that this information is not in the public domain."

41. In reaching a view in this case, the Commissioner also notes he is guided by a recent decision with regard to the same information

requested from Ofcom – see IC-309616-D0J8⁸ – and in that case the Commissioner decided that Ofcom was correct to rely on regulation 12(5)(a) to withhold the information.

42. As a result, the Commissioner is satisfied that, at the time the request was responded to in February 2024, the causal link between disclosure of the withheld information and the adverse effect on national security and public safety has been demonstrated and that the exception in regulation 12(5)(a) is engaged. The information would be of use to individuals wanting to commit acts of terrorism by targeting the mobile mast network or those participating in disruptive activism. Citizens would be put at risk or harmed as a result. In the Commissioner's view there is a clear and tangible link between the requested information and the risk to public safety and national security.
43. As the exception in regulation 12(5)(a) is engaged, the Commissioner has gone on to consider the associated public interest test.

Public interest test

Public interest in disclosure

44. The complainant argued that there is a strong public interest in the scrutiny of the withheld information – the 2020 list of planned sites - as he believed that DSIT “are exaggerating the probability and adverse consequences of disclosure to avoid informed public scrutiny” and because he wished “to understand how the plan has evolved in the past 4 years.”
45. As set out above, the complainant also argued that there was a strong public interest in informed public scrutiny of DSIT's “strategy of siting all these masts in uninhabited areas of the Highlands.” The complainant's view is that: “The notion - that 'foreign agents' might use the planned locations of mobile phone masts in uninhabited regions of Scotland to attack them - is of course ludicrous. Far from threatening our security, if these masts were disconnected, few people would even notice!”
46. DSIT acknowledged that there is a public interest being open and transparent. Specifically, under the EIR, public authorities should foster greater awareness of environmental matters, free exchange of views and contribute to the public debate around environmental decision-making. The building of telecommunication masts is subject to

⁸ <https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/decision-notices/2024/4031121/ic-309616-d0j8.pdf>

significant public scrutiny about the impact of mast construction on the environment and UK citizens and so there is a public interest in the government being open and transparent about decisions on the construction of masts.

47. DSIT also acknowledged that there is a public interest in the government taking accountability of its decisions to build masts that produce electromagnetic fields (EMF) or radio waves, which may impact public health. Individuals may have genuine concerns about the health effects of the EMF, and it would benefit them to know the location of the masts, and also assess whether the EMF levels comply with internationally agreed levels. In addition to this, as part of the Shared Rural Network programme, the mobile network operators (MNOs) have given certain coverage commitments which have been written into their spectrum licences in the form of coverage obligations (the "2020 coverage obligations"). Some individuals may want to know whether the MNOs are likely to bring specific locations into their coverage footprint by extending their mobile coverage to comply with the 2020 coverage obligations.

Public interest in maintaining the exception

48. Regarding the public interest in withholding the information, DSIT strongly argues that disclosing the information in an aggregated form that would aid or assist those who wish to do serious harm to the UK is inherently contrary to the public interest. DSIT's arguments are as follows:
- a. **Protecting the public from telecoms disruption:** Telecommunications are considered critical national infrastructure in the in the UK; businesses in the UK are dependent on telecommunications to transact, and members of the public require the services to work effectively for almost all aspects of their lives. There is a substantial public interest in the government taking measures, including the withholding of sensitive information about the location of masts, to protect the integrity and availability of the telecoms network across the whole of the UK, including for remote communities.
 - b. **Protecting the United Kingdom's critical national infrastructure:** There is a public interest in DSIT protecting the confidentiality of sensitive datasets about the location of masts to protect the operational effectiveness and availability of key public and emergency services, such as the National Health Service, the emergency services and local government. The consequence of disruption would be catastrophic, with consequences including loss of life, serious harm to the vulnerable and detriment to

national and local economies. Withholding the information requested would mitigate these adverse consequences and protect national security.

- c. **Protecting telecoms workers and landowners:** There is a public interest in MNOs being able to effectively exercise their duty of care to workers who visit and maintain masts in remote locations. Withholding the information supports MNOs to protect their workers and the landlords who host their mast from harassment and abuse from individuals engaged in violent and disruptive activism to inhibit the construction of rural mobile network infrastructure.
 - d. **Protecting the emergency services:** There is a public interest in withholding this information to protect emergency services workers from harm by reducing the likelihood of attacks against mobile masts where they would be required to intervene. There is a further public interest in protecting the limited resources of emergency services in remote areas by taking measures, including the withholding of this information, to reduce the number of incidents of vandalism and damage to mobile network infrastructure.
49. Overall, DSIT's argument was that disclosure of the withheld information would put more detailed information about proposed mast sites which may yet become actual sites (or near to which actual sites will be created) into the public domain than was already available at the time of the request. It said that release of the requested data by DSIT would be damaging due to the credibility associated with its 'official' status and would represent an even greater security risk if all the information were to be aggregated into a single dataset, subsequently published and compared alongside the information the requestor holds.

Balance of public interest

50. The Commissioner acknowledges that there is always some public interest in disclosure, for example, to promote transparency, accountability and greater public awareness and understanding of decisions relating to the operation of public bodies. Disclosure in this case would provide the public with an increased knowledge of the proposed location of the masts. This would be of some public interest as the information would then be readily available to interested individuals to search and analyse.
51. The Commissioner acknowledges the complainant's concerns about public scrutiny of DSIT's plans for masts in Scotland, and the public interest in, and importance of, the accountability of public bodies as regards their decision making process. The Commissioner recognises

that the complainant has advanced arguments about a matter of legitimate public interest.

52. The Commissioner accepts that the public needs to be assured that DSIT operates in an environmentally responsible way, and that disclosure of the withheld information might enable the public to better scrutinise DSIT's plans as regards telecommunication masts.
53. Balanced against this is the increased risk to national security and public safety. There is an inherent weight and significance of national security and public safety as a matter of fundamental public interest. In accepting the exception is engaged, the Commissioner is acknowledging there is a possibility the information in question would be used in an attack and to override the public interest in national security the public interest in disclosure would need to be high.
54. Therefore, the Commissioner considers that significant weight should be given to the public interest in protecting national security and public safety in this case so that it can effectively protect the public from telecoms disruption, protect critical national infrastructure, protect telecoms works and landowners, and protect the members and resources of the emergency services.
55. Only when there are compelling arguments for disclosure will it justify releasing information which has the potential to put the public in harm's way or assist someone in preparing an attack. The Commissioner does accept there are arguments for disclosure in this case but the information would likely only be of interest to certain groups and individuals and not to the wider public. Consequently he has found that in all the circumstances the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosure. The withheld information would enable hostile actors to gather valuable information about the DSIT's plans as regards proposed mast sites which may yet become actual sites (or near to which actual sites will be created). There is considerable amounts of information in the withheld dataset and whilst some of this may assist in increasing transparency; to release the entire dataset poses a genuine risk of placing information in the public domain that could be used by motivated individuals for purposes that would endanger public safety. The consequences of a successful terrorist attack or attack by an activist on masts are so great that even if there was only a low risk that disclosing the information would aid such an attack, there is a very strong public interest in withholding the information.
56. This means that the Commissioner's decision, whilst informed by the "presumption in favour of disclosure" under the EIR (Regulation 12(2)), is that the balance of the public interest favours maintaining the

exception provided by Regulation 12(5)(a) in respect of the withheld information. In reaching a view in this case, the Commissioner is also guided by his recent decision with regard to the same information requested from Ofcom – see IC-309616-D0J8.

Other matters

57. DSIT originally misinterpreted the nature of the complainant's request of 12 January 2024 and did not answer the question posed by the complainant in the request. It also initially mistakenly treated the request of 9 February 2024 as a FOIA request instead of an EIR request. The error led to a PIT extension based on FOIA. While this mistake was corrected in DSIT's response of 10 April 2024, this was done without explanation to the complainant. Such a position was not satisfactory and was likely to lead to a complaint to the Commissioner.
58. However, the Commissioner would commend DSIT for their willingness to reappraise its handling of the case during his investigation, and for their voluntary admission to the Commissioner that several procedural errors were made in the case's handling. To rectify this in future, the Commissioner is pleased to note that DSIT's Information Rights Team has implemented a more rigorous quality assurance process to ensure responses are accurate, improved the timeliness of responses, improved its triaging process to identify the correct legislation, and has committed to provide a detailed public interest test in refusal notices to justify its decision to withhold the information.

Right of appeal

59. Either party has the right to appeal against this decision notice to the First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights). Information about the appeals process may be obtained from:

First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights)
GRC & GRP Tribunals,
PO Box 9300,
LEICESTER,
LE1 8DJ

Tel: 0203 936 8963

Fax: 0870 739 5836

Email: grc@justice.gov.uk

Website: www.justice.gov.uk/tribunals/general-regulatory-chamber

60. If you wish to appeal against a decision notice, you can obtain information on how to appeal along with the relevant forms from the Information Tribunal website.
61. Any Notice of Appeal should be served on the Tribunal within 28 (calendar) days of the date on which this decision notice is sent.

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