Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA)

Decision notice

Date:	**2 July 2025**
Public Authority:	**Department for Business and Trade**
Address:	**Old Admiralty Building** **Admiralty Place** **London** **SW1A 2DY**

Decision (including any steps ordered)

1. The complainant submitted a four part request to the Department for Business and Trade (DBT) seeking information about the Government's decision in September 2024 to suspend 30 licenses for the export of military equipment to Israel. DBT refused to confirm or deny whether it held information falling within the scope of part 1 of the request on the basis of sections 38(2) (health and safety), 41(2) (information provided in confidence) and 43(3) (commercial interests) of FOIA. It confirmed that it held information falling within the scope of parts 2, 3 and 4 of the request but withheld this on the basis of sections 38(1), 41(1) and 43(2) of FOIA.

2. The Commissioner's decision is that DBT is entitled to rely on section 41(2) to refuse to confirm or deny whether it holds information falling within the scope of part 1 of the request and is entitled to withhold the information falling within the scope of parts 2, 3 and 4 of the request on the basis of section 41(1) of FOIA.

3. The Commissioner does not require further steps.

Request and response

4. The complainant submitted the following request to DBT on 2 September 2024:

> "It was reported today (2/9/2024) in Parliament, that the UK government has suspended 30 licenses for the export of military equipment to Israel. Please provide the following information in a separate PDF.
>
> 1. A list of the 30 licences announced as suspended today, set out in a table, organised by, type of licence, date of application, date of issue and/or suspension, and ML code, indicating which of these were applied for by the following exporters:
>
> 1.a. UAV Engines Ltd
> 1.b. UAV Tactical Systems Ltd
> 1.c. Elbit Systems UK Ltd or ESUK Ltd
> 1.d. Instro Precision Ltd
> 1. e. Elite KL Ltd
>
> 2. Names for each/any of the above license applications end-users and ultimate end-users in Israel as disclosed in any application document, and/or in any internal public authority record held in relation to each application.
>
> 3. Exporter names for any of the 30 suspended licences that are outside the scope of 1. above, set out in a table, organised by, type of licence, date of application, date of issue and/or suspension, and ML code
>
> 4. Names for each/any of license applications in 3. above for the end-users and ultimate-end users in Israel as disclosed in any application document, and/or any internal public authority record held in relation to each application."[1]

5. DBT responded on 27 September 2024. In relation to parts 1a) to 1e) it neither confirmed nor denied (NCND) whether it held the information on the basis of sections 41(2) (information provided in confidence) and

[1] "UK suspends around 30 arms export licences to Israel for use in Gaza over International Humanitarian Law concerns" – UK government press release https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-suspends-around-30-arms-export-licences-to-israel-for-use-in-gaza-over-international-humanitarian-law-concerns

"43(2)" (commercial interests) of FOIA. In relation to parts 2, 3, and 4 DBT confirmed that it held the requested information but that this was exempt from disclosure on the basis of sections 41 and 43 of FOIA.

6. The complainant contacted DBT on 30 September 2024 and asked it to conduct an internal review of this response.

7. DBT informed him of the outcome of the internal review on 19 December 2024. This upheld the application of the exemptions cited in the refusal notice. However DBT clarified that it was citing section 43(3) rather than section 43(2) of FOIA as a basis to NCND whether it held the information sought by part 1 of the request (in addition to its reliance on section 41(2)). It also confirmed that it was sub-sections 41(1) and 43(2) of FOIA that it was relying on to withhold the information falling within the scope of parts 2, 3 and 4 of the request.

Scope of the case

8. The complainant contacted the Commissioner on 23 January 2025 to complain about DBT's refusal of all parts of his request.

9. During the course of the Commissioner's investigation DBT explained that it also considered section 38(2) (health and safety) to apply to part 1 and sections 38(1)(a) and (b) to apply to parts 2, 3 and 4 of the request.

Reasons for decision

Parts 1a) to 1e) of the request

Section 41(2) – information provided in confidence

10. Section 41(2) provides that –

> "The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, the confirmation or denial that would have to be given to comply with section 1(1)(a) would (apart from this Act) constitute an actionable breach of confidence."

11. In other words, if providing confirmation or denial would, of itself, constitute an actionable breach of confidence, DBT is not obliged to do it.

12. In the context of section 41(2) determining whether there would be an actionable breach of confidence involves considering the following, if the public authority held the information:

- Would it have the necessary quality of confidence?
- Would it have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence?
- Would confirming or denying holding the information be an unauthorised use of it which would cause detriment to the person to whom you would owe a duty of confidence?

If held, whether the information would have the necessary quality of confidence

13. With regards to the first limb of this test, the Commissioner considers that for information to have the necessary quality of confidence it must not be trivial or be otherwise available to the public.

14. DBT argued that the nature of the information sought by parts 1a) to 1e) of the request was more than trivial as it related to sensitive military export licensing information.

15. The Commissioner agrees with this assessment. The first limb is therefore met.

If held, whether the information would have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence

16. With regards to the second limb of the test, the Commissioner considers that an obligation of confidence can be expressed explicitly or implicitly. Whether there is an implied obligation of confidence will depend upon the nature of the information itself and/or the relationship between the parties.

17. DBT explained that under the Export Control Act 2002, there is one main order giving the Secretary of State the power to grant licences – the Export Control Order 2008 (SI 2008/3231). The information provided on licence applications is information provided in confidence to the Government solely to enable it to consider whether a licence for export of certain strategic goods can be granted.

18. DBT explained that article 43 of the Export Control Order 2008 sets out the purposes for which information held by the Secretary of State in connection with the operation of strategic export controls may be used. In particular, article 43(2) states that the information "may be used for the purposes of, and for any purposes connected with (a) the exercise of functions in relation to any control imposed by this Order or by any other order made under the Export Control Act 2002".

19. In view of the above, DBT argued that the information sought by parts 1a) to 1e) – which would include information contained on licence applications such as the names of companies providing particular goods to a named end user – is information which (if held) would have been provided to it with the expectation that it would be treated confidentiality.

20. The Commissioner is satisfied that given the nature of the licensing process as described by DBT above if information is held falling within the scope of parts 1a) to 1e), it would have been provided to DBT with the expectation that it would be treated confidentially. The Commissioner considers such a finding to be in line with the long understanding across the exporting community that government departments involved in the export licensing process will treat applications for export licences (and related information) as being supplied in confidence (including both the names of the companies applying for an export licence and their names linked to specific licence details). The second limb is therefore met.

Whether either a confirmation or denial that the information was held would be detrimental to the confider or any other person to whom a duty of confidence would be owed

21. DBT argued that to confirm or deny whether the five named companies had suspended export licences to export military list items to Israel for end-use by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would likely provide commercially sensitive information regarding the type of goods and destinations a company (the exporter) is trading with another (the end-user).

22. DBT explained that the Government was clear that when announcing the licence suspension that the suspended licences were for goods that "are for use in military operations in Gaza".[2] DBT also explained that the announcement also specified the general types of goods the suspended licences related to, such as "important components which go into military aircraft, including fighter aircraft, helicopters and drones as well as items which facilitate ground targeting" and "components for fighter aircraft (F-16s), parts for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), naval systems, and targeting equipment" and that the suspension would

[2] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-suspends-around-30-arms-export-licences-to-israel-for-use-in-gaza-over-international-humanitarian-law-concerns

exclude components for the F-35 programme where these were not exported directly to Israel for use in Israel.[3]

23. DBT argued that to confirm or deny whether it holds information in the scope of part 1 of the request would provide specific detailed information, such as potentially linking particular companies to suspended licences, specifying an end user (the IDF), and also detailing the types of goods the companies are potentially exporting. DBT argued that to reveal whether such a commercial relationship exists with one or all of these companies would be detrimental to the companies listed as this would be likely to prejudice their commercial interests. DBT explained that it would also reveal the nature of that commercial relationship, trading in military items for end-use in Israel by the IDF. More specifically, DBT argued that such information could be used by competitors to gain an advantage, as linking specific companies to specific known end users (either by confirming a trading relationship or the absence of one) which would likely reveal sensitive customer lists and business practices in the defence sector. DBT also noted that the risk of confirming or denying whether the information is held could be detrimental to the listed companies as it could cause them reputational damage.

24. Based on the above submissions the Commissioner is satisfied that if DBT confirmed whether or not it held information within the scope of parts 1a) to 1e) of the request, there is a risk of detriment to the named parties as it would potentially put them at a competitive disadvantage and damage their commercial relationships.

25. The Commissioner is therefore satisfied that confirming whether or not the withheld information sought by parts 1a) to 1e) is held would constitute an actionable breach of confidence.

Is there a public interest defence to confirming whether or not the requested information is held?

26. Section 41 is an absolute exemption and so there is no requirement for an application of the conventional public interest test. However, the common law duty of confidence contains an inherent public interest test. This test assumes that information should be withheld (or in the case where section 41(2) is being cited, confirmation or denial not provided) unless the public interest in confirming whether or not information is held outweighs the public interest in maintaining the duty of confidence (and is the reverse of that normally applied under FOIA). British courts

[3] https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2024-09-02/hcws64

have historically recognised the importance of maintaining a duty of confidence, so it follows that strong public interest grounds would be required to outweigh such a duty.

27. However, disclosure of confidential information or, as in this case, confirming whether or not information is held, where there is an overriding public interest is a defence to an action for breach of confidence. The Commissioner is therefore required to consider whether DBT could successfully rely on such a public interest defence to an action for breach of confidence in this case.

28. The complainant argued that there was a significant and compelling public interest in DBT confirming the identity of the companies who had licences suspend in September 2024. He provided the Commissioner with detailed submissions to support this position following DBT's introduction of the exemptions contained at section 38, but emphasised that these applied equally to the consideration of the public interests in the context of section 41 (and section 43). The Commissioner has replicated has these submissions below:

> "Any potential embarrassment caused by confirmation of the companies involved in Part 1 of the request does not meet the threshold of harm likely to endanger the health or safety of any individual. There is no detrimental effect other than the potential embarrassment arising from the exposure of the company and government officials to criticism for misleading the public on the nature of exports to Israel. It is important to note, that since at least 2009, representatives of Elbit UK subsidiaries have denied that any of its exports to Israel are for military end use by the Israeli military. These denials have been made to the press, to Parliamentary inquiries into arms to Israel, and even in court testimonies that have led to convictions of activists. Government ministers have apparently supported these company denials in evidence to Parliamentary committees since at least 2009. It is possible that miscarriages of justice have occurred as a result and that convictions may have been based on false evidence and are unsafe. Only full disclosure of all parts of the request can get to the truth of these matters.
>
> Given the context to this FOIA case, and the intense ongoing public debate it relates to, it is clear that once the public authority engaged s38, even if it considered it was correct to do so, it should also have carried have out a public interest test that took into account not just notional harms but also the clearly evident benefits to health and safety of individuals by disclosure, including those convicted and remanded in possible false testimony, and even more so those in the Occupied Palestinian Territories , who are victims of the military operations assisted s by supplies of UK companies to the Israeli

occupying forces, either directly, or via third party commercial entities within Israel who are listed as the end users in the requested information covered by the other parts of this request.

The outcome of the Government review of arms exports to Israel that triggered the 30 licence suspensions in September 2024, was an announcement to Parliament of a clear risk of serious violations of international humanitarian law in the continuance of the 30 licenced exports. That announcement of licence suspensions followed an important ICJ ruling in July 2024

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…If there is any endangerment of health and safety to be found in the context of this FOIA complaint, it is not to to individual in the companies or in the government that may be temporarily embarrassd [sic] by the disclosure of the requested information, but by the real endangerment of life of civilians in Gaza and the West Bank of the Occupied Palestinian Territories that clearly arise from the continuance of secrecy over UK arms exports to Israel.

This danger is well reported in countless press reports and human rights NGO findings that are in the public domain. Since October 2023, the Israeli occupying forces have killed over 50,000 Palestinians in Gaza with lethal military force, most of whom were children. The highest levels of the Israeli military command including the Prime Minister, are currently under warrant for arrests for war crimes by the International Criminal Court. The July 2024 ICJ ruling prohibits the continued aiding and abetting of the illegal occupation as a whole, not just the assistance of the military operations in Gaza. It goes beyond the issues identified in the announcement of the suspension of licences in September 2024

In order to uphold international humanitarian law, as is the obligation of the UK Government it is necessary to positively identify the UK companies that have in the past aided and abetted these unlawful military operations. This will assist in the public monitoring and accountability of UK commercial activities and for the purposes of upholding the UK's international legal obligations under the ICJ ruling and the case of genocide currently before the ICJ.

These arguments equally apply to the application of sections 41 and 43 to all parts of the request on grounds of duties of confidence and the protection of commercial confidence. Again, I submit the application of these exemptions is wrong, and no detriment from disclosure is

evidenced, and if it does exist it is vastly overwhelmed by the vital public interests in disclosure.

For all of the above reasons, it is clearly necessary to bring to an end the shroud of secrecy that has been afforded to the companies involved in UK arms exports to Israel which is unjustified in the context of a real and ongoing crime of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and potential miscarriages of justice in the UK. There is no harm arising from full disclosure of all parts of the requested information. On the contrary, there is a clear benefit to the democratic and judicial process from full transparency and accountability. Disclosure will facilitate democratic engagement in the compliance of UK international obligations and potentially prevent miscarriages of justice in the UK. Most gravely it will help prevent the aiding and abetting by UK authorities and private companies of an ongoing genocide and the illegal military occupation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories."

29. DBT acknowledged that there is a significant public interest in the export of military goods to destinations of concern, including Israel in light of current events. DBT also acknowledged that greater transparency can lead to more informed and nuanced public debate that allows members of the public to better understand key issues.

30. DBT also acknowledged that disclosure of information also ensures that government decisions receive appropriate levels of scrutiny from the public, making government more accountable. This is especially important for decisions made on military export licensing.

31. However, DBT argued that the companies proposing to export controlled goods have acted lawfully in applying for export licences for those goods. It argued that the public interest, therefore, is not in knowing the particular details of the companies exporting and receiving the controlled goods but in knowing that the Government has acted lawfully in the authorisation of exports of controlled military goods through the licensing system. DBT explained that decisions on licensing are made using a risk-based assessment against the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria (the Criteria). Assessment against the Criteria is informed by advice received from other government departments, most notably the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Commonwealth & Development Office. DBT explained that the Criteria is available for public scrutiny and to inform public debate, as are the final licensing decisions made by the Government.

32. DBT noted that Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) has also expanded this publication to include an ad hoc statistics release relating solely to Israel

licences, the most recent publication of which was up to 6 December 2024.[4]

33. DBT also explained that ECJU provides a public searchable database which allows members of the public to conduct bespoke searches of published, and free to use, export licensing data.[5] DBT argued that the public interest in information relating to licensing decisions is met through the transparency in publication of this information. In its view disclosure of the names of companies holding suspended licences would not promote greater understanding or transparency but would be detrimental to the companies in question. DBT emphasised that it was the body that granted export licences after a rigorous assessment process, and the named companies should not be subjected to the reputational damage or financial losses that would occur from potentially being directly connected to a suspended Israel licence based on a retrospective decision by the Government to suspend those licences.

34. The Commissioner accepts that there is public interest in ensuring transparency around arms licensing, especially where such licensing involves, as DBT notes, areas of concern such as Israel. Furthermore, the Commissioner appreciates that the current (ie at the time of the request, albeit still ongoing) situation in Gaza heightens this public interest. The Commissioner therefore accepts that there is a significant public interest in confirming whether of not specific companies are ones who have had licences suspended as part of the Government's announcement in September 2024. This is on the basis that provision of such information would provide some further transparency about the government's decision to suspend a number of licences.

35. However, in attributing weight to such arguments the Commissioner considers it important to remember a point he made in a previous case, IC-109528-K3H7, involving arms licensing:

> "However, the Commissioner considers that the public interest in transparency and accountability of UK exports of military equipment and arms primarily lies with Government rather than the exporting companies concerned. The Commissioner considers it to be an important point that it is the Government that licenses such exports, and that companies (whatever the view many may have as to the

[4] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/export-control-licensing-management-information-for-israel/israel-export-control-licensing-data-6-december-2024
[5] https://www.exportcontroldb.trade.gov.uk/sdb2/fox/sdb/

ethics or morality of the arms trade) have acted lawfully by applying for such licences."[6]

36. Applying this position to the context of this present case, the Commissioner accepts the validity of DBT's point that the companies who have had their licenses suspended (which may or may not include those listed in part 1) should not be subject to reputational damage on the basis that they have had their licences revoked, following a previous decision by the Government to provide such licenses. Moreover, the Commissioner accepts that there is an inherent public interest in ensuring fairness of competition which is likely to be impacted if DBT confirmed whether it held the information falling within the scope of part 1. Furthermore, the Commissioner is mindful of the wider public interest in preserving the principle of confidentiality. The Commissioner recognises that the courts have taken the view that the grounds for breaching confidentiality must be valid and very strong since the duty of confidence is not one which should be overridden lightly.

37. The Commissioner has carefully considered both parties' submissions. He accepts that confirming whether or not DBT holds information falling within the scope of part 1 would provide further transparency around the Government's announcement of September 2024, and given the controversy surrounding the Israel Gaza conflict, such interest should not be underestimated. However, despite the notable weight that should accorded to such interests he is not persuaded that this outweighs the potential detrimental impact on the companies listed in question and the wider public interest in preserving the principle of confidentiality. In reaching this decision the Commissioner has also taken into account the fact that to operate effectively the licensing process relies on applicant companies having confidence that information they provide to DBT will be treated confidentiality (an argument made by DBT in the context of section 41(1) below). The Commissioner is also conscious of the information proactively published about the licensing process, as well as the information released by the Government in September 2024 when the decision to suspend the licenses was announced.

38. Therefore, having considered all the circumstances of this case the Commissioner has concluded that there is not a valid public interest defence to confirming whether or not DBT holds the information sought by part 1. DBT is therefore entitled to rely on section 41(2) to refuse to

[6] https://ico.org.uk/media2/migrated/decision-notices/4021176/ic-109528-k3h7.pdf paragraph 66

confirm or deny whether it holds the information sought by part 1 of the request.

39. In view of this finding the Commissioner has not considered DBT's reliance on sections 38(2) and 43(3) to refuse to confirm or deny whether it holds the information sought by this part of the request.

Parts 2, 3, and 4 of the request

Section 41(1) – information provided in confidence

40. Section 41(1) of FOIA states that:

> "Information is exempt information if –
>
> a) it was obtained by the public authority from any other person (including another public authority), and
>
> b) the disclosure of the information to the public (otherwise that under this Act) by the public authority holding it would constitute a breach of confidence actionable by that or any other person."

Was the information obtained from another person?

41. DBT explained that the information falling within the scope of parts 2, 3 and 4 of the request was provided to it by the various companies who made the licence applications.

42. The Commissioner accepts that this is the case and this criterion is therefore met.

Does the information have the necessary quality of confidence?

43. DBT argued that the withheld information has the quality of confidence as it consists of the End User, the Ultimate End User, the ML code, the date of application, the date of issue/suspension, and the type of licence. The information is therefore not trivial but rather relates to highly sensitive commercial licensing information. DBT also noted that such information is not in the public domain.

44. Again, the Commissioner agrees with this assessment and accepts that this criterion is therefore met.

Was the information imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence?

45. With regard to the process by which the companies provided the withheld information, DBT referred the Commissioner to the legislation governing the licence application process set out above at paragraphs

17 to 18. Therefore, DBT argued that the information was provided during each of the company's applications for their export licence and was provided in the understanding it would remain confidential.

46. More specifically, DBT explained to the Commissioner that the companies in question had confirmed in writing that they have active Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) in relation to information in scope of this request and all have advised that given the nature and sensitivity of the products, the customers, and the ultimate end users, it would constitute a breach of confidence to disclose this information. DBT argued that as part of their export licence application, exporters have an opportunity to provide their objections against public disclosure of information into the public domain and all the exporters provided an express request that they would like the information to be treated in confidence.

47. In view of the above, the Commissioner is satisfied that the information was provided to DBT by the various companies with the expectation that it would be treated confidentially. This criterion is therefore met.

Would disclosure be detrimental to the confider?

48. DBT argued that disclosure of the information would be likely to harm the commercial interests of the exporters, the End Users, and the Ultimate End Users in that it would reveal specific, detailed information regarding the goods the companies are trading in and the commercial relationships which exist between the companies and end users/ultimate end users in question. DBT argued that this would be likely to harm business relationships between UK companies and their overseas customers, which could result in a loss of business. DBT explained that as part of its consideration of this request it had contacted all of the companies who had provided information falling within the scope of these parts of the request to ascertain their views on disclosure of the information in scope of the request, and whether disclosure would be a breach of confidence. DBT explained that all of the companies responded by confirming that this was the case and cited either existing NDAs directly related to those licences or confidentiality requirements. (The Commissioner was provided with a copy of the company responses.)

49. DBT argued that this detriment would be reputational and financial as the companies in question would be likely to lose customers. DBT highlighted that amongst the comments provided to it by the companies were representations that disclosure would be "exposing their international customer base", cause "significant commercial detriment", "undermine their good standing in relation to being a good exporter", and result in "customers choosing alternative suppliers" and the "loss of existing contracts".

50. After careful consideration of the information available to him in relation to this matter, the Commissioner is satisfied that the disclosure of the information would be likely to cause detriment to the confider, as described in the above paragraphs.

Is there a public interest defence to the disclosure of the information?

51. As explained above, section 41 is an absolute exemption and so there is no requirement for an application of the conventional public interest test. However, the common law duty of confidence contains an inherent public interest test.

52. The complainant's arguments with regard to the public interest in disclosure of information sought by parts 2, 3 and 4 are set out above.

53. DBT acknowledged that there is a public interest in informed debate regarding the licensing and export of controlled goods.

54. However, it also argued that there is a strong public interest in ensuring that the commercial interests of external businesses or other organisations are not damaged or undermined by disclosure of information which is not common knowledge, and which could adversely impact on future business.

55. DBT argued that disclosure of the information sought by parts 2, 3 and 4 of the request would undermine the export licensing process which would also be likely to cause it detriment. DBT argued that exporters might be reluctant to include the same level of information on export licence forms if there is a risk that some or all of the information they submit might be made public. DBT argued that this would impact on its ability to assess licence applications effectively because of the risk of delays to licence applications due to insufficient/incomplete information and the risk of applications being stopped or refused as a result of this.

56. In view of the above, DBT argued it did not consider that there is an overriding public interest that would cause it to set aside its obligations of confidence to the companies who provided the information falling within the scope of parts 2, 3 and 4 of the request.

57. DBT also noted that in a previous decision notice, which also sought details of licensing applications, the Commissioner concluded that:

> "70. In weighing the above public interest arguments for and against disclosure, the Commissioner is mindful of the wider public interest in preserving the principle of confidentiality. The Commissioner recognises that the courts have taken the view that the grounds for breaching confidentiality must be valid and very strong since the duty of confidence is not one which should be overridden lightly. Whilst

much will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, a public authority should weigh up the public interest in disclosure of the information requested against both the wider public interest in preserving the principle of confidentiality and the impact that disclosure of the information would have on the interests of the confider….

73. The Commissioner has considered all the circumstances of this case and the nature of the information being withheld under section 41(1). He has concluded that there is stronger public interest in maintaining the obligation of confidence than in disclosing the information. Therefore, the Commissioner finds that the condition under section 41(1)(b) is also met and that DIT is entitled to withhold the requested information in part 5 of the request under section 41(1) of FOIA."[7]

58. In the Commissioner's view the consideration and weight that should be given to the public interest factors in relation to the application of section 41(1) to parts 2, 3 and 4 are essentially the same as in his consideration of section 41(2) to part 1 of the request. This because all parts of the request essentially seek the identities of the companies who had their licences suspended in September 2024 and details of those licences.

59. Therefore, for the reasons set out above at paragraph 34 to 38 the Commissioner has concluded that there is not a valid public interest defence in this case to the disclosure of the information sought by parts 2, 3 and 4. Such information is therefore exempt from disclosure on the basis of section 41(1) of FOIA.

60. In view of this finding the Commissioner has not considered DBT's reliance on sections 38(1) and 43(2) to withhold the information falling within the scope of parts 2, 3 and 4 of the request.

[7] https://ico.org.uk/media2/migrated/decision-notices/4021176/ic-109528-k3h7.pdf

Right of appeal

61. Either party has the right to appeal against this decision notice to the First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights). Information about the appeals process may be obtained from:

    First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights)
    General Regulatory Chamber
    PO Box 11230
    Leicester
    LE1 8FQ

    Tel: 0203 936 8963
    Fax: 0870 739 5836
    Email: grc@justice.gov.uk
    Website: www.justice.gov.uk/tribunals/general-regulatory-chamber

62. If you wish to appeal against a decision notice, you can obtain information on how to appeal along with the relevant forms from the Information Tribunal website.

63. Any Notice of Appeal should be served on the Tribunal within 28 (calendar) days of the date on which this decision notice is sent.

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